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What design guidelines exist for ATEX-compliant design in mixers for organic powders?

For mixers processing organic or other combustible powders, ATEX-compliant design is always the outcome of a material-, process- and plant-specific assessment. The product designation alone is not sufficient: what matters is the actual fine-dust fraction, moisture, particle size, possible solvent or fragrance vapours, temperature, process pressure and the operating states from start-up to cleaning. For mixers and mixing plants, VDI 2263 Sheet 10 is a central design guideline; it expressly addresses fire and explosion protection for mixers with dust, gas, vapour and hybrid mixtures.

Zone concept and material data

Zone classification belongs in the operator's explosion-protection document. Zone 20 exists where an explosive dust atmosphere is present continuously, for long periods, or frequently, inside a mixer, filter, silo or conveying line. Zone 21 covers areas where such an atmosphere can occasionally occur during normal operation, for example at filling, discharge or sampling points. Zone 22 describes areas where it occurs only rarely and briefly. The specific delineation results from dust release, tightness, extraction, cleaning and the surrounding conditions.

Zone 20 generally requires a very high level of protection; in the classic ATEX categorisation this regularly corresponds to Category 1D. For Zone 21, Category 1D or 2D is permissible, and for Zone 22, Category 1D, 2D or 3D. The assignment covers electrical and non-electrical components: motors, sensors, actuators, shafts, bearings, seals, mixing tools, flaps and conveying equipment must be considered together. The appropriate conformity assessment and the need for an EU-type examination depend on the equipment category, equipment group, equipment type and the applicable ATEX conformity assessment procedure; an EU-type examination is therefore not generally required for every Category 1D or 2D device.

Representative safety-related material data are required before detailed design work begins. These include, at a minimum, KSt, maximum explosion pressure pmax, minimum ignition energy, minimum ignition temperature of the dust cloud, minimum ignition temperature of the dust layer, particle size distribution, moisture and electrical conductivity. Where volatile liquids or solvents are added, vapour-dust hybrid mixtures must be assessed separately, since ignition and explosion behaviour can differ from that of pure dust. General minimum-ignition-energy ranges for “detergent dusts” or other product groups are not sufficiently reliable and should not be used as a basis for design.

Preventing ignition sources

Avoiding effective ignition sources is a central layer of protection. EN 1127-1 considers various types of ignition source, including hot surfaces, flames and hot gases, mechanically generated sparks, electrical equipment, stray currents, static electricity, lightning strike, electromagnetic radiation and exothermic reactions. EN ISO 80079-36 and -37 are relevant for assessing non-electrical equipment and its potential ignition sources.

Mechanical clearances, material pairings, possible contact points and foreign bodies must be designed so that no dangerous friction, impact or grinding sparks occur during normal operation or under the malfunctions to be considered. There is no generally valid maximum speed such as “below 1 m/s” for mixing tools in Zone 20. The permissible circumferential speed depends on geometry, materials, particle size, possible ingress of foreign bodies, probability of contact, temperature, the mixing task and further protective measures. It must be justified as part of the ignition-hazard assessment.

Bearings and seals are critical points. Possible measures include externally mounted bearings, effective separation of the product space from the drive space, suitable shaft seals, temperature monitoring and condition monitoring. The measures must suit the powder, the rotational speed, the pressure, the temperature and the intended cleaning procedure. For dust layers, TRGS 723 generally specifies a safety margin of 75 °C between the minimum ignition temperature of the dust layer and the surface temperature, unless the risk assessment permits a different value.

Electrostatic charging can represent an ignition source, particularly with dry, fine and poorly conductive powders. A consistent earthing and equipotential-bonding concept is required, together with an assessment of conductive and insulating components, and suitable hoses, filter media, flexible connections, containers and personal protective equipment. TRGS 727 describes the requirements for avoiding electrostatic ignition hazards. A blanket earthing resistance of 10⁶ Ω cannot be applied to all plant components and applications. For Type C FIBCs, for example, TRGS 727 specifies a dissipative resistance of less than 10⁷ Ω to the earthing point; Type D FIBCs do not require earthing, but may only be used where it has been demonstrated that no hazardous charging occurs.

Electrical equipment must be suitable for the assigned zone, the dust atmosphere and the permissible surface temperature. For dust-protected electrical devices, a dust-tight degree of protection such as IP6X is often relevant; however, the required degree of protection and marking follow from the chosen protection principle and the specific equipment approval. Intrinsic safety can be sensible for certain measurement and control circuits, but it is not a universal requirement for all sensors in the mixer.

Protection concept and inerting

A protection concept follows a hierarchy. First, it is examined whether a hazardous explosive atmosphere can be avoided or limited, for example through enclosed process control, limiting dust release, or inerting. Effective ignition sources are then avoided. If both goals cannot be reliably achieved, constructive measures to limit the consequences of an explosion are added.

Inerting reduces oxygen using a suitable gas, often nitrogen, until the oxygen content lies below the limiting oxygen concentration determined specifically for the material and process. A blanket target value of less than 8 volume percent oxygen is not permissible; the permissible operating concentration must be derived from the limiting oxygen concentration, measurement uncertainty, leakage assumptions, process fluctuations and a defined safety margin. Inerting requires a sufficiently gas-tight plant, a suitable inert gas supply, oxygen measurement, defined alarm and shutdown values, and safety-related interlocks.

For recipes containing oxidising agents, such as sodium percarbonate, inerting must be assessed with particular care. Sodium percarbonate can release oxygen on decomposition and intensify fires. Reducing oxygen with nitrogen therefore replaces neither temperature control nor the assessment of thermal decomposition, possible contamination or exothermic reactions.

Constructive protective measures can include explosion-pressure-resistant or explosion-pressure-shock-resistant apparatus, pressure relief, flameless venting, explosion suppression and the decoupling of connected plant components. EN 14460 addresses explosion-resistant equipment; EN 14491 addresses explosion pressure relief, and EN 14373 addresses the design, application, effectiveness testing, operation and maintenance of explosion suppression systems. Such systems are intended for enclosed or substantially enclosed enclosures and do not apply to unstable, explosive, pyrotechnic or pyrophoric substances.

Decoupling is particularly important so that explosions cannot propagate through lines to filters, silos, dosing and filling plant. Suitable solutions can include non-return valves tested for explosion protection, quick-acting slide valves, chemical barriers, explosion protection valves, or rotary valves suited to this purpose. Every decoupling device must match the dust explosion class, the pipework, the process direction, the pressure conditions and the installation situation.

Documentation and inspection

The design must be documented comprehensibly in the manufacturer's risk assessment and in the operator's explosion-protection document. This covers material data, zones, ignition-hazard assessment, equipment categories, the protection concept, interfaces, operating limits, maintenance, cleaning, inspections, and the treatment of start-up, shut-down, recipe changes and malfunctions.

Inspections are required before commissioning and at recurring intervals, in accordance with the regulations applicable at the site. In Germany, the requirements of the Hazardous Substances Ordinance (Gefahrstoffverordnung) and the Ordinance on Industrial Safety and Health (Betriebssicherheitsverordnung) must be observed in particular. A structured HAZOP or comparable safety study can be very worthwhile for complex mixing plants, but it is not a blanket statutory requirement for every plant.

How amixon® supports ATEX-compliant design for organic powders

Design for Zone 20 applications

In mixing processes with organic or other combustible powders, the interior of the mixer is frequently classified as Zone 20. Zone 20 denotes an area in which an explosive dust atmosphere is present continuously, for long periods, or frequently. The final zone classification of the overall plant is the operator's responsibility and must be recorded in the explosion-protection document. Besides the mixer, it also takes into account raw material intake, dosing, filters, conveyors, silos, charging and discharge, filling, cleaning and maintenance.

amixon® can execute its mixers, granulators, vacuum mixing dryers and mixing reactors with a product space classified as Zone 20. Depending on the series and project configuration, this applies, for example, to single-shaft mixers, vertical and cone mixers, container mixers, continuous mixers, and the vacuum mixing dryers and mixing reactors VMT and AMT. Zone 20 generally requires a very high level of protection, which in the classic ATEX categorisation regularly corresponds to Category 1D. The specific equipment category, surface temperature, electrical and non-electrical equipment, earthing and documentation must be defined on a project-specific basis according to the material data and operating conditions.

The ATEX Equipment Directive 2014/34/EU concerns equipment and protective systems for use in potentially explosive atmospheres. The ATEX Workplace Directive 1999/92/EC sets out requirements for operators, including risk assessment, zone classification, the explosion-protection document and recurring inspections. amixon® can provide the apparatus documentation for the delivered machine configuration. Responsibility for the zone concept, the risk assessment and the overall explosion-protection assessment of the production plant remains with the operator.

Ignition sources and process control

amixon® vertical mixers can be operated at low circumferential speeds. For the VM and HM series, amixon® specifies an adjustable range of approximately 0.8 to 3.5 m/s. Low tool speeds can limit mechanical energy input as well as friction, impact and abrasion energy. However, they are not a general demonstration that no effective ignition source occurs. The ignition-source assessment must also include bearings, seals, shafts, tool-to-wall contacts, foreign bodies, blockages, surface temperatures, electrostatic charging and electrical components.

An ATEX-compliant design may require temperature and torque monitoring, controlled rotational speed, suitable bearing and seal concepts, foreign-body management, earthing, equipotential bonding and preventive maintenance. For dust layers, TRGS 723 generally specifies a safety margin of 75 °C between the minimum ignition temperature of a dust layer and the surface temperature, unless the risk assessment permits a different value.

When liquid components such as surfactants, oils or fragrance formulations are added, droplet size, dosing quantity, viscosity, temperature and the point of introduction must be matched to the product movement. The aim is even distribution without promoting local over-wetting, lump formation or impermissible build-up. Completely build-up-free processing cannot be guaranteed as a general rule. For enzyme granulates, fine organic powders or oxidising components such as sodium percarbonate, moisture, temperature, mechanical stress and possible vapour-dust hybrid mixtures must be assessed with particular care.

Tightness, pressure and inerting

Product areas designed with minimal seams and ground smooth, closed transfer points and suitable seals can reduce dust escape. According to amixon®, Clever-Cut® inspection doors with OmgaSeal® sealing are designed for low-dead-space sealing of the product space. The actual tightness achieved, however, depends on pressure differentials, seal material, wear, maintenance and process control. A dust-tight construction can limit dust deposits in the installation room, but it does not replace extraction, cleaning or the assessment of a possible secondary explosion.

The vacuum mixing dryers and mixing reactors VMT and AMT can be built gas-tight, vacuum-tight and pressure-tight. They are therefore suitable for mixing, reaction, granulation or drying processes under vacuum, positive pressure or an inert gas atmosphere. The achievable vacuum level, permissible pressure rating and temperature ranges must be defined on a project-specific basis. Pressure or vacuum resistance alone does not mean that an apparatus is designed to be explosion-pressure-resistant or explosion-pressure-shock-resistant. A corresponding design requires assessment of KSt, pmax, minimum ignition energy, ignition temperatures, particle size, moisture and hybrid mixtures.

With a suitable design, inerting can be used as a preventive explosion-protection measure. In vacuum apparatus, for example, the process space is evacuated and then flooded with a suitable inert gas. Repeated vacuum-pressure cycling can reduce the oxygen content further. amixon® describes this procedure for vacuum mixing dryers and synthesis reactors.

The oxygen concentration must remain, with a defined safety margin, below the limiting oxygen concentration determined for the specific powder-inert gas system. What is required is a sufficiently gas-tight apparatus, a suitable inert gas supply, representative oxygen measurement, alarm limits and safety interlocks. Inerting prevents neither self-ignition nor thermal decomposition nor oxygen release from oxidising components. It is therefore only one element of a complete protection concept.

Continuous processes and testing

For high throughputs, the continuous mixer AMK can be used. According to the manufacturer, the AMK operates with a controlled fill level; the mean residence time is influenced by fill level and throughput. Liquid addition, mass flow, mixing intensity and residence time must be designed jointly for the specific recipe. For fragrances, viscous surfactants, enzyme granulates or oxidising constituents, mixing trials with the original product are required to assess homogeneity, moisture, temperature, particle integrity, discharge and cleanability.

amixon® states that it operates more than 30 test units of various sizes at its Paderborn site and additionally maintains international pilot plants. Trials with the original product can be carried out under practice-relevant fill levels, pressure and temperature conditions. The results support the selection of mixer, tools, seals, liquid addition and operating parameters. They do not, however, replace either the safety-related testing of the material or the explosion-protection assessment of the overall plant by qualified specialists.